

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS

A. PROCEDURAL FACTS

On March 30, 2016, a federal Grand Jury sitting in Las Vegas, Nevada, issued an indictment against the defendant, Jan Rouven Fuechtener, charging him with one count of Possession of Child Pornography, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 2252A(a)(5)(B); one count of Receipt of Child Pornography, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 2252A(a)(2) and (b); one count of Receipt of Child Pornography, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 2252A(a)(2) and (b); and one count of Advertising of Child Pornography, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 2251(d)(1)(A). The indictment also contains forfeiture allegations pertaining to the child pornography allegations.

B. SUBSTANTIVE FACTS

In August 2015, a Task Force Officer (TFO) from the FBI Buffalo Field Office Child Exploitation Task Force (CETF), operating in an undercover capacity, was accepted into the network of an individual utilizing the user name "Lars45" on the GigaTribe peer-to-peer (P2P) file-sharing network. The network was known for exchanging child pornography. On August 4, 2015, through a chat message within the GigaTribe P2P file sharing program and within the child pornography interest network, Lars45 initiated contact with the TFO and provided the password to his locked shared folders on GigaTribe. The TFO was able to browse Lars45's shared directories and observed thumbnail previews of many images/videos of child pornography, as well as file titles indicative of child pornography.

1 On September 14, 2015, the TFO signed on to GigaTribe and observed that
2 Lars45 was again logged into the network. Using the password previously supplied by
3 Lars45, the TFO successfully downloaded numerous files of child pornography from the
4 password protected folders Lars45 was sharing. The files of child pornography were
5 from one IP address. In this case, the IP address that provided the password to the
6 child pornography files was determined to originate from 7080 Donald Nelson Avenue,
7 Las Vegas, Nevada ("the Residence"). Subpoenas sent to GigaTribe revealed that the
8 account had an email address of larsschmidt22@hotmail.com.
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10 On January 21, 2016, FBI Special Agent Mari Panovich executed a Federal
11 search warrant at the Residence. Upon execution of the aforementioned search
12 warrant, law enforcement made contact with Fuechtener at the subject residence,
13 which is owned by Fuechtener and Frank Dietmar Alfter, the Defendant's husband.

14 Also during execution of the warrant, agents seized 38 devices, and numerous
15 alarm clock cameras located throughout the Residence. Trained experts conducted
16 forensic examination of the devices found throughout the Residence, and discovered
17 that devices found in virtually every area of the house revealed child pornography
18 videos and images.

19 The defendant admitted post-*Miranda* to Special Agent Panovich that
20 larsschmidt22@hotmail.com was his email address, and that he downloads from
21 GigaTribe with the user name "Lars45." U.S. Magistrate Judge George W. Foley issued
22 a search warrant for the larsschmidt22@hotmail.com. The returned documentation
23 from Hotmail shows several email communications between Fuechtener (using the
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1 name Lars) sent from larsschmidt22@hotmail.com to craigslist.com users. The emails
2 include picture attachments and text identifying “Lars” as Fuechtener, an email chain
3 where the defendant signs within the same chain as “Lars,” and “JAN.” A confirmation
4 email for a credit card transaction conducted by “Jan Fuechtener” buying something
5 from www.sketchysex.com with user name “larsusa22” was also in the
6 larsschmidt22@hotmail.com email. Finally, the search warrant also returned an email
7 sent in April 2015 from GigaTribe to the larsschmidt22@hotmail.com, for username
8 “lars45,” informing Fuechtener that his “Ultimate” subscription would expire due to
9 the bank declining payment.

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11 Fuechtener was later indicted by the Federal Grand Jury on the above
12 mentioned charges. At his arraignment, he pled not guilty. ECF No. 16. On May 24,
13 2016, Fuechtener provided a two-page expert notice giving notice of his intention to call
14 Larry Smith as an alleged expert witness regarding “online file sharing programs such
15 as Gigatribe as well as cloud based file sharing programs such as Google Drive or
16 Dropbox,” as well as “how computer files are stored and time stamped including but not
17 limited to the differences in military time, UTC time, and regular time.” ECF No. 38,
18 2. The notice states that Mr. Smith “has been unable to conduct a full forensic
19 examination at this juncture,” but that “defense will supplement this notice as more
20 information becomes available.” To date, the Government has not received any
21 supplement or an expert report from the defense.

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ARGUMENT

The Court should exclude Mr. Smith's testimony for three separate and distinct reasons. First, the defense has only provided a short summary containing vague descriptions as to what Mr. Smith will allegedly testify to at trial, and the defense has failed to provide the Government and Court with Mr. Smith's expert report. Thus, the Court is left unable to perform its gate-keeping function, and the Government is unfairly deprived of its right to challenge Mr. Smith's premises, methodology, and conclusions. Second, notwithstanding Mr. Smith's purported qualifications as provided in the defense's notice and Mr. Smith's CV, Mr. Smith is not qualified to testify about online file sharing programs, and forensic examinations about how computer files are stored and time stamped. Finally, because the differences in "military time, UTC time, and regular time" are definite mathematical calculations, able to be conducted by jurors with common knowledge, and the calculation is judicially noticeable, it does not require expert opinion.

1. Mr. Smith should not be allowed to testify because the defense has failed to provide Mr. Smith's expert report, failed to comply with Federal Rule of Evidence 702, and failed to comply with Rule 16.

Only relevant evidence is admissible. Fed. R. Evid. 402. Evidence is relevant if "it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence" and "the fact is of consequence in determining the action." Fed. R. Evid. 401. Even relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger that admission of the evidence would confuse the issues or mislead the jury. Fed. R. Evid. 403.

As a threshold prerequisite to admissibility, the expert's proposed testimony must

1 help the jury “understand the evidence” or “determine a fact in issue.” Fed. R. Evid.
2 702(a). If the expert’s testimony does not illuminate any issue in the case, then the
3 testimony is not admissible and the Court need not consider the reliability of that
4 testimony. *Id.* at 702(b-d); *Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc.*, 509 U.S. 579, 591 (1993)
5 (explaining that Rule 702(a) “goes primarily to relevance,” and “[e]xpert testimony which
6 does not relate to any issue in the case is not relevant and, ergo, non-helpful.”).

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8 Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence establishes that expert testimony should
9 be admitted where (1) the expert’s specialized knowledge is helpful to the trier of fact, (2)
10 the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (3) the testimony is the product of
11 reliable principles and methods, and (4) the witness has applied the principles and
12 methods reliably to the facts of the case. Rule 702 was amended to include these standards
13 after the Supreme Court’s decision in *Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.*, 509
14 U.S. 579 (1993). Under *Daubert*, the trial court must make sure that expert testimony is
15 not only relevant but reliable. This is the court’s “gatekeeping function,” and the court
16 must “make certain that an expert, whether basing testimony upon professional studies or
17 personal experience, employs in the courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that
18 characterizes the practice of an expert in the relevant field.” *Kumho Tire Co. v.*
19 *Carmichael*, 526 U.S. 137, 152 (1999). Importantly, *Daubert* does not require a court to
20 admit or to exclude evidence based on its persuasiveness; rather it requires a court to
21 admit or exclude evidence based on its scientific reliability and relevance. *Ellis v. Costco*
22 *Wholesale Corp.*, 657 F.3d 970, 982 (9th Cir. 2011), citing *Daubert*, 509 U.S. at 589–90.
23 To ensure that expert testimony is both reliable and relevant, the Court should engage
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1 in a three-part inquiry, considering whether:

2 (1) the expert is qualified to testify competently regarding the matters he
3 intends to address; (2) the methodology by which the expert reaches his
4 conclusions is sufficiently reliable as determined by the sort of inquiry
5 mandated in *Daubert*; and (3) the testimony assists the trier of fact,
6 through the application of scientific, technical, or specialized expertise, to
7 understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue. *Id.*

8 In short, these basic requirements are qualification, reliability, and helpfulness. *Id.*

9 In order to be reliable, proposed expert testimony must be supported by
10 “appropriate validation-*i.e.*, ‘good grounds.’” *Id.* at 1261, *quoting Daubert*, 509 U.S. at 590.
11 The trial judge has the task of ensuring that an expert’s testimony rests on a reliable
12 foundation. *Id.*¹ The proponent of expert testimony always bears the burden of showing
13 that his expert meets those three requirements. *Id.*

14 Rule 16(b)(1)(C) sets forth that the Defendant must, at the government’s request,
15 give to the government a written summary of any testimony that the Defendant intends to
16 use under Rules 702, 703, or 705 of the Federal Rules of Evidence as evidence at trial, and
17 that the summary must describe the witness’s “opinions, the bases and reasons for those
18 opinions, and the witness’s qualifications.”

19 The district court serves a gatekeeper function in evaluating scientific testimony.
20 *Daubert*, 509 U.S. at 579. When a district court is faced with a proffer of scientific
21 testimony, it must make a preliminary determination under Federal Rule of Evidence 702

22 ¹ The following factors may be considered when determining reliability of expert
23 testimony, although the inquiry is meant to be flexible and is not limited to these
24 issues: “(1) whether the expert’s theory can be and has been tested; (2) whether the
theory has been subjected to peer review and publication; (3) the known or potential
rate of error of the particular scientific technique; and (4) whether the technique is
generally accepted in the scientific community.” *Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.*, 509 U.S. 579, 593-94 (1993).

1 whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid. *Id.*
2 at 592-93. A key question to be answered in determining whether a theory or technique is
3 scientific knowledge that will assist the trier of fact will be whether it can be (and has
4 been) tested. *Id.* at 593. The objective of this gatekeeping requirement is to ensure the
5 reliability and *relevancy* of expert testimony. It is to make certain that an expert, whether
6 basing testimony upon professional studies or personal experience, employs in the
7 courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert
8 in the relevant field. *Kumho Tire*, 526 U.S. at 152. This gatekeeping requirement applies
9 not only to scientific testimony but to all expert testimony covered by Federal Rule of
10 Evidence 702. *Id.* at 147-49.

12 Federal Rule of Evidence 702 requires a valid connection to the pertinent inquiry as
13 a precondition to admissibility. *Id.* at 149 (quoting *Daubert*, 509 U.S. at 592). And where
14 such testimony's factual basis, data, principles, methods, or their application are called
15 sufficiently into question...the trial judge must determine whether the testimony has a
16 reliable basis in the knowledge and experience of [the relevant] discipline. *Id.* (citations
17 omitted). [W]here foundational facts demonstrating relevancy or qualification are not
18 sufficiently established, exclusion of proffered expert testimony is justified. *LuMetta v.*
19 *United States Robotics, Inc.*, 824 F.2d 768, 771 (9th Cir. 1987).

20 Here, the defendant's notice of expert testimony provided a cursory summary of Mr.
21 Smith's anticipated testimony, but to date, the Government has not been provided a copy
22 of Mr. Smith's report. Without an expert report, the Court is left unable to perform its
23 gatekeeping function in evaluating scientific testimony, and the defense has failed to meet
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its burden to show that the testimony is relevant, reliable, helpful, and otherwise admissible.² Moreover, the notice of expert testimony fails to comply with Rule 16(b)(1)(C). The notice merely states what the defendant anticipates Smith's testimony to be, but fails to provide "expert disclosure required under Rule 16(b)(1)(C), Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure" as required under Rule 16 and demanded in the Government's Disclosure Statement filed May 9, 2016. ECF No. 25. The notice fails to provide a written summary that testimony describing "the witness's opinions, the bases and reasons for those opinions, and the witness's qualifications." Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(b)(1)(C). Accordingly, this Honorable Court should exclude Mr. Smith's testimony.

2. Mr. Smith should not be allowed to testify as an expert in the area of online file sharing programs because he is not qualified.

Notably absent from Mr. Smith's CV is any indication that he has been trained or even has familiarity with Peer-to-Peer (P2P) programs, or P2P investigations, let alone "online file sharing programs such as Gigatribe as well as cloud based file sharing programs such as Google Drive or Dropbox," as set forth in the defense's notice. ECF No. 38, 2. Indeed, Mr. Smith's CV shows that his alleged training is limited to three areas: (1) data recovery specialist, (2) physical abuse and sexual abuse detail, and (3) computer forensics unit. *Id.* at Ex. 1, 1. As a data recovery specialist, Mr. Smith used "special tools, techniques, and software programs to make forensically sound copies of suspect hard drives and related media and analyze[d] those copies for evidence of a crime or that no

² Furthermore, without Mr. Smith's report, the Government has been prevented from securing any rebuttal witnesses that it may need. Thus, for this additional reason that the defense's non-disclosure of Mr. Smith's report has prejudiced the Government, Mr. Smith should not be allowed to testify as an expert witness.

1 proof that a crime had occurred.” *Id.* As a part of the physical and sexual abuse detail, he
2 investigated “physically abused child and the elderly,” and helped with the “apprehension
3 of sex offenders when their target was children and their tool was the Internet and/or a
4 computer.” *Id.* Finally, as a part of the computer forensics unit, Mr. Smith investigated
5 “any crime where a computer, PDA, or cell phone was used to facilitate that crime.” *Id.*

6 At best, only Mr. Smith’s work on the sexual abuse detail may be remotely relevant
7 to online file sharing programs, but even then, that detail ended in 2000, over 15 years
8 ago. Most file-sharing programs were not in existence 15 years ago, and GigaTribe, the
9 only P2P program at issue in this case, came into existence in 2005, and was launched in
10 the United States in 2008. *See* Don Reisinger, *Web 2.0 file-sharing service is bringing free*
11 *peer-to-peer private file sharing to the U.S.*, (Nov. 17, 2008),
12 <http://www.cnet.com/news/gigatribe-brings-private-p2p-sharing-to-u-s/>. Any expertise Mr.
13 Smith might have possessed in 2000 is woefully outdated and irrelevant. Accordingly, Mr.
14 Smith is unqualified and should not be allowed to testify about “online file sharing
15 programs such as Gigatribe as well as cloud based file sharing programs such as Google
16 Drive or Dropbox.”

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19 **3. Mr. Smith should not be allowed to testify as an expert in the area of**
20 **forensic testing because he is not qualified.**

21 Very recently, in *United States v. Anousone Savanh*, No. 2:14-cr-290-KJD-PAL, the
22 Honorable Judge Kent Dawson found that Mr. Smith was not qualified as an expert in
23 computer forensics and excluded his expert testimony. In a pre-trial motion, Judge
24 Dawson held that Mr. Smith could testify as a lay witness about “his own examination of

1 the computer at issue, particularly to what pornography he did or did not find on it.”
2 *Savanh*, No. 2:14-cr-290-KJD-PAL, ECF No. 135, 3. Judge Dawson left open whether the
3 defense could offer Mr. Smith’s expert testimony based on foundation laid at trial. *See id.*
4 However, at trial, Judge Dawson found that sufficient foundation had not been laid and
5 Mr. Smith was not qualified to opine on computer forensics. *See Savanh*, No. 2:14-cr-290-
6 KJD-PAL (Trial Testimony, Voir Dire of Larry Smith).

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8 First, conspicuously absent from Mr. Smith’s CV is any criteria that suggests that
9 he is an expert able to opine about “how computer files are stored and time stamped.”
10 ECF No. 38, 2. But, in any event, another judge in this district as recently as last month
11 found that Mr. Smith was not qualified to opine on computer forensics and only allowed
12 Mr. Smith to testify as a lay witness. The latest update on Mr. Smith’s CV is from
13 February, 2016, over 5 months ago. As Mr. Smith has not achieved any additional
14 qualifications in the last month, as reflected in his CV, Judge Dawson’s prior finding
15 should hold true in this case as well.

16 **4. Mr. Smith should not be allowed to testify as an expert about the**
17 **differences in “military time, UTC time, and regular time” because the**
18 **calculations are a sum definite, able to be conducted by the average**
juror and the calculation is judicially noticeable, ergo not requiring
expert opinion.

19 Under the first prong of Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the expert must
20 have “specialized knowledge.” But, if knowledge is within the common understanding of
21 jurors, or judicially noticeable by not being subject to reasonable dispute, then it does not
22 require an expert to set it forth. Indeed, Rule 201 permits a court to take judicial notice of
23 adjudicative facts “not subject to reasonable dispute.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(a). A judicially
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1 noticed fact must be one not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) generally
2 known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) capable of accurate and
3 ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.
4 Fed. R. Evid. 201(a). In a criminal case, however, the trial court must instruct the “jury
5 that it may, but is not required to, accept as conclusive any fact judicially noticed.” Fed. R.
6 Evid. 201(g).

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8 Nothing in Mr. Smith’s CV suggests any specialized knowledge that allows him to
9 explain the differences in military time, UTC time, and regular time. This is likely
10 because subtracting 7 from a number does not require any specialized knowledge, but
11 rather only elementary arithmetic. A simple Google search reveals consistently that
12 Universal Time Coordinated (UTC) is 7 hours ahead of Pacific Daylight Time (PDT). Thus,
13 $PDT = UTC - 7$ hours. Any juror can convert the time using basic mathematics without an
14 expert. Because said knowledge does not require expert knowledge, the United States
15 respectfully requests that the Court take judicial notice of the fact that UTC is 7 hours
16 ahead of Pacific Daylight Time, and exclude Mr. Smith’s testimony on this point.

17 II. CONCLUSION

18 Based on the foregoing, the Government respectfully requests this Court exclude
19 the testimony of Larry Smith.

20 Respectfully submitted this 12th day of July, 2016.

21
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23 United States Attorney

24 /s/

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CERTIFICATE OF ELECTRONIC SERVICE

This is to certify that the undersigned has served counsel for Defendant Jan Rouven Fuechtener with the foregoing by means of electronic filing.

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July 12, 2016

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